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Localism and the Big Society: the asset transfer of leisure centres and libraries ± fighting 
closures or empowering communities? 
 
Geoff Nichols,  Deborah Forbes , Lindsay Findlay-King , and  
Gordon Macfadyen  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper critically examines the µDVVHWWUDQVIHU¶RIOHLVXUHVHUYLFHVIURPWKHSXEOLFWRWKH
YROXQWDU\VHFWRU$VVHWWUDQVIHUPLJKWEHWKHRULVHGDVµDXVWHULW\ORFDOLVP¶LQZKLFK
volunteers are obliged to fill the gaps left by retreating public provision or as µSURJUHVVLYH
ORFDOLVP¶; which represents new opportunities through the localism and Big Society agendas 
to develop more locally responsive, cooperative and mutualist visions. In this way it might 
RYHUFRPHWKHOLPLWDWLRQVRI8QLWHG.LQJGRPSROLFLHVLQZKLFKµ%LJ*RYHUQPHQW¶LVUHSODFed 
by civic society. Drawing on qualitative interviews with key personnel (volunteers, managers 
and local authority officers) at twelve leisure facilities, a grounded assessment of the nuanced 
EDODQFHEHWZHHQµDXVWHULW\¶DQGµSURJUHVVLYHORFDOLVP¶is provided including three 
observations. First, the main impetus for transfer was cuts in local authority budgets which 
stimulated the emergence of local groups of volunteers. Secondly, the transfers themselves 
required interaction between local government and the volunteer groups; however the nature 
of the relationship and support given varied and support was limited by austerity. Thirdly, 
volunteers do not automatically fill a gap left by the state. Without support transfer viability 
relies on the financial and social capital among volunteer groups which is unevenly 
distributed. These ILQGLQJVVXJJHVWWKHFDSDFLW\IRUDµSURJUHVVLYHORFDOLVP¶WRHPHUJH
through asset transfer is limited. However, where transfer has occurred, there are some 
progressive benefits of volunteer empowerment and a more flexible service. 
 
 
Keywords. Volunteer, asset transfer, Big Society, progressive localism, austerity localism, 
leisure  
 
  
 Introduction 
 
The Big Society (Cabinet Office, 2010) has been defined as the UK Government attempting 
to roll-back the state and encourage citizens to take responsibility, via community and 
voluntary groups, for provision of public services at a local level (Crisp, 2015; Lowndes & 
Pratchett, 2012). The Localism Act (2012) reflected a policy of reducing the central state and 
devolving power and responsibility to voluntary groups (King, 2014). At the same time the 
Government introduced extensive reductions in local government finance which provoked 
local authority retrenchment or efficiency strategies (Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, Besemer & 
Bramley, 2015). 7KHVHFRPELQHGFKDQJHVPDGHWKHHQVXLQJDXVWHULW\µSHFXOLDUO\ORFDOLQ
QDWXUH¶'RQDOG*ODVPHLHU*UD\	/REDRS5HSODFLQJVWDWHSURYLVLRQDWDORFDO
level by volunteer-led groups with rHGXFHGIXQGLQJKDVEHHQWHUPHGµDXVWHULW\ORFDOLVP¶
(Featherstone, Ince, Mackinnon, Strauss & Cumbers 2012, p.177). In contrast, the term 
µSURJUHVVLYHORFDOLVP¶GHQRWHs a political sensibility that does not cede the language of 
localism to the political right, and instead experiments in place-based political activity that 
both challenges morally-conservative and neoliberal articulations of localism, and generates 
new expressions of social justice and participation. Theorisation of localism, however, has 
developed faster than empirical examination of these progressive possibilities.  
 
This paper critically assesses the balance between austerity and progressive localism through 
an empirical examination of the process of transfer of the ownership, management and 
GHOLYHU\RIOHLVXUHVHUYLFHVIURPWKHSXEOLFWRWKHYROXQWDU\VHFWRU7KLVµasset transfer¶might 
epitomise µDXVWHULW\ORFDOLVP¶± using volunteers and the private sector to fill the gaps left by 
retreating public provision.  On the other hand, it may create opportunities to develop more 
µSURJUHVVLYH¶FRRSHUDWLYHDQGPXWXDOLVWHQWHUSULVHVWKDWDUHPRUHUHVSRQVLYHWRORFDOQHHGV
(Crisp, 2015; Williams, Goodwin & Cloke, 2014) and articulate an alternative approach to 
meeting them (Williams et al., 2014).   
 
Examining the balance between austerity and progressive localism in the transfer of leisure 
services is especially relevant because the provision of leisure services such as sports 
facilities and green spaces is not statutory and library provision must only be deemed to be 
µFRPSUHKHQVLYH¶DQXQGHILQHGWHUPLQDQRYHUDOOORFDODXWKRULW\DUHD3XEOLF/LEUDULHVDQG
Museums, 1964). Thus, although the high political profile of leisure facilities makes their 
closure undesirable, local government is nevertheless seeking to dissociate itself from 
funding them in order to protect other areas of expenditure, and has attempted to find 
alternative service-deliverers through asset transfer to achieve the savings required.  
 
Drawing on qualitative interviews with key personnel in eight sport facilities and four 
libraries this paper examines the mechanisms of public-to-voluntary asset transfer, and 
provides insights into how volunteers have achieved it, what support has helped them, and 
what has constrained them.  
 
 
Austerity localism, progressive localism and The Big Society 
 
The political ideals of a Big Society (Conservative Party, 2010) involved changing the 
balance between the public sector and voluntary sector.  At a local level more responsibility 
was to be taken for the provision of services by volunteer-led groups.  However, this 
expansion of active citizenship coincided with substantial cuts in public spending.  Between 
2010 and 2014/15 cuts to welfare benefits and tax credits of £18 billion were outlined, along 
with £53 billion cuts in budgets of local authorities and government departments (Clayton, 
Donovan & Merchant, 2016).  A critical analysis has described the emergence of local groups 
to provide services ± which would otherwise be cut - as µDXVWHULW\ORFDOLVP¶(Featherstone et 
al., 2012, p.177).  µCLWL]HQUHVSRQVLELOLVDWLRQ¶ (Hastings, et al., 2015, p.613) is promoted by a 
hegemonic, anti-state, neoliberal discourse which upholds a shift towards local provision, 
expanded civic enterprise and social responsibility as a positive phenomenon (Featherstone, 
et al., 2012, p.177).   In this sense hegemony is a body of practices and expectations of 
ourselves and our world which embody assumptions preventing relations of domination and 
VXERUGLQDWLRQEHLQJFKDOOHQJHGDVWKH\DUHSUHVHQWHGDVµFRPPRQVHQVH¶ZLWKLQDGRPLQDQW
discourse.   The notion of a Big Society is part of this discourse ±criticised as less about 
empowerment of local communities as about the use of volunteerism to hide the failed state 
(Levitas, 2012; Such, 2013; Williams, et al., 2014).  It has been argued that these new groups 
are unable to challenge the hegemonic assumptions within the Big Society narrative, 
including the need for austerity and the widening of social and economic inequalities (Nolan 
& Featherstone, 2015).  Such groups are merely µIODQNLQJPHDVXUHV¶-HVVRS, p.452) or 
µOLWWOHSODWRRQV¶3HFN	7LFNHOOS, stepping in to fill the gaps left by state 
removal, rather than creating new forms of democracy.   
 
,QFRQWUDVWµSURJUHVVLYHORFDOLVP¶is claimed (Crisp, 2015, Clayton et al., 2016, Featherstone 
et al., 2012) to involve local volunteer groups being able to ³transcend their immediate 
locality and «feed(ing) into broader social and political movements that aim to transform 
national and international policy frameworks, thereby reversing the neoliberalisation of inter- 
and extra-local relations´ (Featherstone et al. 2012, p.118).  Progressive localism thus opens 
new opportunities to resist neo-liberalist hegemony within the localist agenda. TKHµOLWWOH
SODWRRQV¶may be able to challenge the view that austerity and inequality are inevitable.  For 
example, &ULVS¶VVWXG\RIWork Clubs found that while they were unable to 
effectively replace former programmes to address social and economic disadvantage they 
could still challenge the prevailing orthodoxies around punitive forms of welfare-to-work.   
 
Thus Featherstone HWDO¶s (2012) main GHILQLQJFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIµSURJUHVVLYH¶localism is that 
it attempts to challenge the dominant hegemony; in particular, the need for austerity and 
greater income inequality.  For Levitas (2012) the Big Society narrative is part of this 
hegemony because it involves moving socially necessary labour from the public sector to 
unpaid work, and justifies public sector cuts and increasing economic inequality. However, 
Levitas argues for a µhermeneutics of faith¶: the creation of a narrative in which the Big 
SRFLHW\DQGUHGXFHGFRQVXPSWLRQ³cease to be an ideological cover for neoliberal 
dispossession of the poor, and become positive attributes embedded in another potential 
society´ (Levitas, 2012, p.336).  ThH³«conditions under which these ideas would cease to 
be repressive, morali]LQJFODSWUDS´ (Levitas, 2012, p.336) include: rethinking what counts as 
SURGXFWLRQDQGZHDOWKDQGWKLQNLQJRIµZRUN¶LQWHUPVRIWKHµTotal Social Organization of 
Labour¶.  Taking a different approach, Williams et al. (2014) suggest the need for a more 
grounded examination of the cracks and fissures in austerity localism that might be exploited 
by progressive groups to challenge the neoliberal hegemony. 
   
These theoretical critiques of localism are related to those in the Big Society Audit (Civil 
Exchange, 2015). Achievements included: some public services engaging the voluntary 
sector in new kinds of partnerships; the voluntary sector remaining resilient, resourceful and 
trusted, and strengthening communities; and volunteering remaining high compared to other 
countries (although at static levels since 2001).  However, limitations included services being 
unable to meet the requirements of those who need them most thus exacerbating gaps 
between rich and poor.  Service cuts varied geographically and hit the vulnerable hardest 
(Donald et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2014).  The Big Society agenda ignored variance in 
privilege (Macmillan, 2011)PHDQLQJWKRVHZKRDUH³«HPSRZHUHGE\HPHUJLQJforms of 
ORFDOLVPDUHOLNHO\WREHWKRVHZLWK«UHVRXUFHVH[SHUWLVHDQGVRFLDO FDSLWDO«´ (Featherstone 
et al. 2012, p.178).  There was a lack of dialogue with partners to find a way of adapting to 
budget cuts, and a failure to establish a strong partnership with the voluntary sector. Williams 
et al. (2014, p.2802) further note that the UK government does not offer the support to ensure 
³democraWLFDQGHTXLWDEOHSDUWLFLSDWLRQ´.  In fact, the voluntary sector and the community are 
considered to be external to local governmenWDV³«VXEMHFWVWREHPDQLSXODWHGUDWKHUWKDQDV
potentLDOSDUWQHUVWREHZRUNHGZLWK«´ (Rees & Rose, 2015, p.89), and have received 
GHYROXWLRQRI³UHVSRQVLELOLW\DQGVHUYLFHGHOLYHU\UDWKHUWKDQSRZHUDQGDXWKRULW\´
(Featherstone et al. 2012, p.181).     
 
The Audit (Civil Exchange, 2015) concluded that power was not being significantly 
transferred from the state and that ³large companies [were] benefiting most from public 
VHFWRUFRQWUDFWV«ZLWKDELDVDJDLQVW WKHORFDODQGYROXQWDU\VHFWRU´ (p.7). The Big Society 
localism emphasised µFRPSHWLWLRQDQGPDUNHWVROXWLRQV¶SZKLFKPD\IRUFHRXW
voluntary community solutions, thereby favouring the private sector or charitable offshoots of 
private companies¶.   
 
Although the Big Society SROLF\LVRIIWKHµSROLWLFDOOH[LFRQ¶&ULVSS and did not 
feature in the 2015 UK election campaign, the impact of the policy continues, through related 
initiatives to promote localised service delivery by µthe community¶, and consistent 
commitments to increase the role of third sector organisations in the delivery of public 
services and the promotion of citizen action and community organisation (Alcock, 2016, 
p.111). Therefore, the examination of asset transfer in leisure centres remains valid as 
demonstrating the balance between austerity and progressive localism, and the practicality, or 
otherwise, of Big Society ideals. 
 
 
An overview of asset transfer in leisure services 
 
Recent asset transfers in leisure are different from the earlier generation of facility transfers 
from public sector to trusts in the UK, such as Sheffield International Venues (SIV) or 
Greenwich Leisure Limited (GLL).  In those cases, volunteers took roles in governance as 
trustees, but the process was led by paid employees of the local authority from which the 
facility management was being transferred, with a much longer time for planning the transfer.  
In the more recent examples in our study, volunteers plan and execute the transfer to trust 
status themselves, and take roles of governance and delivery afterwards, often working to 
tight deadlines.   
 
A UHYLHZRIORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶ZHEVLWHVLQ$SULOLivsey, 2015) showed that nine 
national operators ± the majority operating as a form of Non-Profit Distributing Organisation 
± managed facilities in 44% of authorities.  Of 161 contracts with local authorities, three 
operators held 61%, tKXVWKHPDUNHWLVGRPLQDWHGE\DIHZµELJSOD\HUV¶  Some of these, such 
as Greenwich Leisure Limited emerged from the first generation of trusts.  This supports the 
Civic Exchange criticism that market solutions favour an oligopoly of large providers, often 
from the private sector. An overview of libraries is provided by Public Libraries News 
(2016), which provides regular updates on library closures and transfers.  Since April 2011, 
242 libraries have closed, with 100 being taken over by volunteer groups or social 
enterprises.  An additional 103 mobile libraries have also closed.  Thus asset transfer of 
libraries to volunteers has been more significant than that of sports centres.  In contrast to the 
market for managing sports facilities the market for libraries is not dominated by large 
commercial competitors.     
  
In this paper we look at the asset transfer of leisure services and how this process works, in 
order to answer the following questions: 
 
- How has the process of asset transfer of public sport centres and libraries to voluntary 
groups been driven by and reflected austerity? 
- +RZKDVDVVHWWUDQVIHUEHHQµSURJUHVVLYH¶LQHPSRZHULQJYROXQWHHUVDQGPDNLQJWKH
service more responsive to local needs?   
- Does the transfer exhibit the limitations of engendering a Big Society, as indicated by 
the Civil Exchange audit (2015)? 
 
Methods  
 
A scoping exercise, via a questionnaire to members of the Chartered Institute for the 
Management of Sport and Physical Activity (CIMSPA), was initially undertaken to examine 
the issues arising with asset transfer.  The response was too small for quantitative analysis. It 
showed that a qualitative, inductive, approach was required to understand the complexities of 
this new phenomenon. Six respondents indicated willingness to be interviewed and were 
contacted for the main study.  Other participants (from relevant cases) were recruited from 
personal contacts of the research team.  Thus the sample for this research included 11 
sport/library facilities which had transferred to voluntary operation from local authorities and 
one facility which had developed volunteers to work alongside employees.  Some were single 
facilities, others represented multiple facilities.  Interviews were conducted with volunteers 
who had led the transfer process, managers of transferred facilities, a manager of a 
community action organisation, and local authority officers. In most facilities only one 
interview was conducted; however, overall the sample gave contrasting perspectives on 
transfers.    
Table 1 lists brief descriptions and details of interviewee roles.  Further detail is available on 
a website where cases are described in detail (Nichols, Forbes, Findlay-King & Macfadyen, 
2015; CIMSPA, 2016). 
 
 
Table 1. Facility Overview 
 
Facility Facility 
type 
Context Ranking of local 
government 
spending cuts per 
head, by 10 UK 
regions (Innes & 
Tetlow, 2015, p.8)  
Interviewee role 
 
Sport 
Facility A 
 
Swimming 
pool 
Urban  4th Trustee (volunteer) 
Sport 
Facility B 
 
Single 
sport 
Academy 
Rural 2nd Director (volunteer) 
Sport 
Facility C 
Swimming 
pool and 
Urban 2nd Chief Executive (paid) 
 gym 
Sport 
Facility D 
 
Swimming 
pool and 
gym 
Urban 4th Trustee (volunteer) 
Sport 
Facility E 
 
Swimming 
pool 
Urban 4th Manager (paid) 
Sport 
Facility F 
 
Swimming 
pool 
Rural 4th Trustee(volunteer) 
Sport 
Facility G 
 
Swimming 
pool 
Rural 4th Three interviewees: all 
trustees (volunteers ± 
including CEO of  
Community Action 
Organisation) 
Sport 
Facility H  
Swimming 
pool 
Rural 4th Facility Manager (paid) 
Libraries A 
 
Multiple 
libraries 
Urban/Rural Not listed Community Library 
Development Officer 
(paid) 
Library B 
 
Single 
library 
Urban 4th Steering-group member 
(Volunteer) 
Library C 
 
Single 
library 
Urban 2nd Trustee (Volunteer) 
Libraries D 
 
Multiple 
libraries 
Urban 3rd Two interviewees: 
Chief Executive of 
Charity  and Assistant 
Director of Culture and 
Leisure (L.A.) (both 
paid) 
 
An interview schedule was devised based on concepts identified in previous research and the 
literature.  Themes covered within the overall interviews includedto cover the background of 
the organisation, the reason for transfer, the process of transfer, the involvement of 
stakeholders (e.g. local authority, volunteer groups, etc.), the role of volunteers before and 
after the transfer, the benefits and challenges of volunteer delivery, and the long-term 
prospects and sustainability.  The interviews were recorded and transcribed and a coding 
frame was devised to address the questions in this paper.  Interview transcripts and summary 
case descriptions were approved by interviewees, which was important because of the 
political sensitivity around asset transfer.  Facilities are anonymised in this paper 
 
Results and discussion 
 
The results are structured by examining, first, the nature of what has been transferred, and 
secondly, how this transfer process worked and was supported.  This structure reflects 
criticisms of asset transfer made in the Civic Exchange audit.  This description allows us to 
discuss how these volunteer-led transfers compare with the ideals and limitations of 
engendering the Big Society and comment on the balance between austerity and progressive 
localism by responding to our initial questions. 
 
What is transferred?   
 
There was no standard model for asset transfer. Both volunteers and local authorities were 
learning from their experience across a wide range of situations.  Asset transfers varied in 
that: 
 
x Volunteers may be involved in governance or management or delivery, or all three. 
x Transfer may involve the delivery of the service, or the maintenance of the 
facility/building, or both.  
 
In addition, the legal relationship with the local authority differed.  In all cases the local 
authority continued to own the facility as landlord, but the nature and length of the lease 
varied, as did the responsibilities contained within it.  Some volunteer groups received direct 
funding such as an annual grant, free use of a facility, or payment of capital costs prior to 
transfer.  All received some indirect funding, which included rate relief, subsidised/no rent 
(most leases are on a peppercorn rent), or equipment passed over with a lease.  
 
Local government is required to provide 80% relief on non-domestic (business) rates to 
charities, but has the discretion to provide 100% relief.  Prior to April 2013, local government 
had to pay business rates to central government on its own leisure facilities.  Thus the first 
generation of leisure trusts, registered as charities, saved considerable transfer of rates from 
local to national government.  Since 2013, local authorities can keep a proportion of the 
business rate income (DCLG, 2011).  So if local government now gives 100% rate relief, 
rather than 80%, this is a direct cost to its own income.  Even if it has given 100% relief in 
the past, local government can reduce that to 80%.  For example, Sport Facility B had 100% 
relief for 2 years ± an important benefit ± but this was subject to regular review.  Thus local 
authority discretion over the amount of rate relief can provide uncertainty for financial 
planning of the transferred facilities.   
 
Whilst some facilities considered themselves to have had little support from the local 
authority, they all received financial support indirectly through peppercorn rents (in one case 
this was only £1 a year for a swimming pool).  Some facility managers implied criticism of 
local authority motives as giving UHQWUHOLHIWRJDLQµUHIOHFWLYHJORU\¶   In all cases the 
facilities, even where breaking even, were reliant on local government subsidy whether it be 
underwriting of peppercorn rent and rate relief or direct grants.  Thus all models of asset 
transfer were dependent on financial support from the local state, as similarly observed by 
Fenwick and Gibbon (2015) in their review of an asset transferred swimming pool.  
 
How does the asset transfer process work? 
 
There has been no set way in which asset transfer is instigated, processed and supported.  
 
In all the facilities in our study asset transfer was stimulated by local government leisure 
budget cuts, a characteristic of austerity localism.  The process, from announcing planned 
asset transfer or closure of a facility, to the planned transfer date, was often less than 12 
months.  Several themes arose in the analysis of this time-pressured process, including: 
- The support given by local authorities and volunteer development agencies, and 
whether it was sufficient; 
Comment [LF1]: Have set up for 
discussion here and ahead of the actual 
discussion later on. Remove one? 
- The disadvantaging of small volunteer groups in the transfer and support process; 
- The social capital and community stability evident in and around those volunteer 
groups who needed to fill the gap left when these services looked set to close and to 
overcome the deficiencies in support during the transfer process.   
 
The support given by local authorities and volunteer development agencies and whether it 
was sufficient 
      
Volunteer groups interested in taking on a facility had to engage with a professional bidding 
process.  Firstly, they had to establish an appropriate legal entity (with seven different types 
possible) and prepare a business plan to show that they could manage the leisure facility.  
Volunteer-led groups struggled to decide on the best legal identity to establish.  A description 
of the alternative legal identities is provided in the Sport England (2014) Asset Transfer Tool 
Kit, although none of the organisations we interviewed were aware of this: it was produced 
after their original asset transfer.  In some cases local authorities provided time from local 
officers to help with planning; others had commissioned a volunteer support agency to give 
assistance; or in some cases the volunteers did all the work themselves. 
 
Support of a development officer and volunteer development agencies was extremely 
valuable in recommending and establishing the appropriate legal entity, preparing a business 
SODQDQGGHYHORSLQJWKHYROXQWHHUV¶FRQILGHQFH, such that they felt ready to take 
responsibility for a facility.  This support, apparent in Sport Facility G and Libraries A and B, 
lifted a considerable burden from the volunteers.  For example, a Rural Community Action 
organisation (CAO) supported Sport Facility G by providing a guide, tailored for the 
circumstances of this swimming pool.  The CAO explained and supported the formation of a 
new trust as a charity limited by guarantee.  As one trustee said: 
 
« ,ZRXOGQ¶WKDYHEHHQLQDSRVLWLRQWRZULWHDEXVLQHVVSODQDQGZHQHHGHGWKDW
support off [CAO] to do that, «we needed that expertise to get us up and running.  
 
Similarly, Library B and others in the same city were supported by the local Voluntary 
Action organisation6XSSRUWSUHYHQWHGQHZJURXSV¶HQHUJ\EHLQJGLVVLSDWHGLQWRWKHse 
demanding tasks of which volunteers had little or no experience.  Support could be tailored to 
the group.   
 
The best examples of local authority support showed responsiveness in doing everything they 
could to ensure the community transfer was successful. This was evidenced by extensions of 
leases to allow for grant applications or absorbing loss of income from competition with other 
local authority facilities.  In these cases, a clear relationship could be seen with the local 
authority; for example, at Sport Facility A, a volunteer reported: 
 
«ZH¶GKHDUGORDGVRIVWRULHVDERXWJURXSVIDOOLQJRXWZLWKWKHFRXQFLODQGWKHP
KDYLQJWKLVUHDOµZHKDWH\RXEHFDXVH\RX¶UHGRLQJWKLV¶UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHFRXQFLO
DQGLWMXVWGLGQ¶WZRUNDQGWKHEXildings end up closed, « ZHUHDOO\GLGQ¶WZDQWWR
take that approach to it.  We obviously had to be a partnership relationship with the 
council and they had to be open to what we were doing and then work with us « it 
was a pretty seamless handover. 
 
It was clear that not only local authority guidance, but also local political support and 
goodwill made asset transfer easier for voluntary groups.  For example, Sport Facility A 
worked closely with council officers to make the transferred facility viable, despite it being in 
competition with the remaining local-authority-run facilities.  This reflected a political 
commitment within the council, facilitated by a prominent local politician being a member of 
the voluntary group.  Similarly, at Sport Facility G, the district council was very supportive 
and employed the county volunteer support organisation to assess the viability of a transfer 
and then support it.  Other facility volunteers were critical of the training and advice they 
received from the local authority, but still noted that there was a desire for them to succeed 
among local politicians.  As one facility director said, ³in terms of their moral support they 
wanted us to do it; it was whether or not we could actually provide the evidence that we could 
do all oIWKHDVSHFWVWKDWWKH\ZDQWHG«´. 
 
 
The disadvantaging of small volunteer groups in the transfer and support process 
 
Despite examples of supportIn contrast there were groups who stated that support was not 
provided or was considered to be not relevant enough to the community group¶V needs.  Most 
described being offered some generic support for business planning, but not for continuing to 
run the building as a leisure facility, with a volunteer staff base.  For example, in Sport 
Facility B the council and enterprise agency gave support, but for a range of community 
assets of which sport and leisure made up only one part.  The council ran seminars on asset 
transfer which Council run seminars covered legal, business and financial models, but did not 
focus specifically on how to run a sport facility.  The current facility director informed us that 
an An RIILFHUZLWKµHQWHUSULVHH[SHUWLVH¶ met with the community group to give advice, but 
this officer did not have experience of volunteer-led facilities.   
 
Technical training on how to run the facilities was often lacking.  The new manager of Sport 
Facility E had to teach himself how to operate the boiler as no instructions had been 
provided.  The leader of the group which took over Sport Facility F, found that his technical 
knowledge of water treatment, from his paid employment, was essential.   The Sport Facility 
B group educated themselves on how to prevent legionella developing in the showers.  It 
seems remarkable that local authorities do not, have technical manuals describing the running 
of facilities which they could hand over to volunteers, even if they are unable to provide 
relevant training.  In the case of Library B, the city libraries service provided extensive 
training in use of the library management system that linked all the libraries together, 
enabling the exchange of books.   Clearly, the more extensive the training offered to 
volunteers, the more able they will be to manage the facility. 
 
Managing the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) legislation (TUPE) was 
inconsistent and unclear.  Only one transferred facility had been able to take on the same 
local authority staff, as others could not afford to pay the same wages and meet the pension 
liabilities.  In Sport Facility G and A, the local authority redeployment of staff  enabled the 
the new groups  to employ new staff to do the same work.  A similar redeployment occurred 
to allow Sport Facility A to employ new pool staff.  In another county, Sport Facility B was 
to operate a specialist single sport academy, which was therefore not considered a business 
transfer; thus existing leisure centre staff could be made redundant.  This arrangement means 
that the academy is not able to run the same activities as provided by the former leisure centre 
and cannot continue to call the facility a leisure centre, as this would be contrary to TUPE 
regulations.  The duration of this restriction, however, is unclear.  In contrast, paid librarians 
in one city have been made redundant and volunteers are running the same libraries. Thus 
TUPE is an area where councils and volunteer groups need guidance if volunteer groups are 
not to be deterred from taking on such responsibilities.  
 
Short facility-lease lengths could be problematic as the lease had to be long enough to allow 
the facility to bid for grants to maintain or develop the building This was the case in Sport 
Facility E where, in 2014, 21 years after the volunteer-led trust started to run the pool, the 
council extended the lease by 20 years to allow a successful bid for £50,000 from Sport 
England to fund refurbishment.  Similarly, Sport Facility B had to have a minimum 10-year 
lease to gain a Sport England grant to repair the heating system.  Therefore care needs to be 
taken in how leases affect voluntary organisations.  The conditions of the lease may 
themselves be negotiated.  In one case, three years after transfer, there was still disagreement 
DERXWWKHOHDVH¶VLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUIDFLOLW\PDLQWHQDQFH$VOHDVHOHQJWKV
and content vary, this is another area where support is needed if community groups are not to 
be disadvantaged.  
 
 
Social capital and community stability to fill the gap, where support is lacking 
 
Volunteers often found the transfer-planning process more difficult than operating the facility 
afterwards.  Where groups had achieved asset transfer without support the volunteers 
themselves had to contribute excessive time - a limited and unevenly distributed resource 
(Such, 2013).  An extreme example was the volunteer director of Sport Facility B who 
contributed 7 days a week for 3 years, in addition to his normal job.  During the 6-month 
SHULRGRIWUDQVIHUELGGLQJWKLVYROXQWHHU¶VQRUPDOFRDFKLQJUROHat the facility had to be put 
aside.  It was not until 3 years later that the volunteer felt able to restrict his time at the centre 
to 5 days a week.  At Sport Facility A, a volunteer reported working to prepare for the 
WUDQVIHUXQWLO³2 or 3 am every night after my day-MREILQLVKHGDWSP´.  Advice she would 
give if mentoring somebody would be, ³Do you really want to work full-time and then work 
another full-time job on top of it to oSHQVRPHWKLQJLQWKHFRPPXQLW\"´  However, she also 
felt the task had provided a lot of satisfaction.  
 
In such circumstances, asset transfer required volunteers not only to give up a significant 
amount of time, but also to have the appropriate skills, confidence and tenacity.  This often 
meant facing judgement from the local authority, with some groups receiving feedback 
stating that they were expected to fail.  For example, the manager of Sport Facility E thought 
that the local authority wanted to close the pool and only allowed a volunteer-led trust to take 
it over as they thought it would fail.   
 
Our study revealed considerable anecdotal evidence of potential asset transfers which had not 
happened or had failed. It was suggested that these transfers failed because dedicated, skilled 
and confident volunteers are rare, and are not evenly distributed across society.  However, 
oversupply of amenities and other business issues may also have played a part in the demise 
of some facilities.  Authorities which had taken a developmental approach, such as with 
Libraries A and D and the support agency helping Sport Facility G, reported that much more 
support was required to develop volunteer groups in socially disadvantaged areas. As one 
CEO of a voluntary action group said about supporting a series of asset transfers across a 
city: 
 
The demography will be really important. Some of them will have ... people with 
professional skills ± lawyers, accountants, etc. ± they need the technical support to set 
up a community organisation, but they will have a lot of the business skills they can 
transfer to the running of an organisation. ... There will be other places where people 
do not have the skills, or need a lot more focussed support to develop them. 
 
Apart from developing skills and confidence, the population in such areas tended to be less 
stable, which leads to the sense of community ownership and interest in facilities being 
weaker, volunteer capacity being limited and a new group being more fragileand fragile.  A 
sense of community ownership or interest in a facility is important to be able to draw on for 
volunteer capacity.  Many participants talked about generations of local people who had used 
the facilities (for example, Sport Facilities A, C and G).  In this respect Sport Facility B was 
an exception because, although the facility was in an area of high social deprivation, the sport 
club which took over the facility had a national reputation and a regional catchment area.  It 
had a pool of supporters and volunteers who were mainly parents of the young sports people.  
It was also different because the centre could be reorganised to focus on meeting the 
specialist needs of the sports club, rather than remaining a community facility with longer 
opening hours and lower levels of demand.  
 
 
In all transfers complex decisions needed to be made in a short time-frame, and this was very 
difficult where advice was lacking., for example on the best legal identity to establish.  
Mentoring and contact with other volunteer-led asset transfers was valuable but should have 
been facilitated, in SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ view, by the local authority.  As one facility director said: 
 
«ZHVKRXOGDOPRVWKDYHDOLWWOHJURXSRIFRQVRUWLXPVWKDWJHWWRJHWKHUWRGLVFXVs the 
LVVXHVZH¶YHKDGWKHSUREOHPVZH¶YHKDGKRZZH¶YHtried to overcome some of 
those, EHFDXVHDWWKHPRPHQWZHVWLOODUHOLWWOHLVRODWHGLVODQGVDQGZHGRQ¶WKDYHDQ\
sort of support from similar bodies, « WKDW¶VSUREDEO\VRPHWKLQJZKLFK,ZRXOG
recommend, « 
 
The Sport England (2014) Asset Transfer Toolkit provides examples from a small sample of 
transferred facilities, but this could be extended to a supportive network, identifying contacts 
who would be willing to advise volunteer groups considering accepting a transfer.  For 
OLEUDULHVWKHZHEVLWHµ3XEOLF/LEUDULHV1HZV¶6), which is independently run by a 
librarian in his spare time as a volunteer, provides a database of all the libraries transferred to 
volunteers.  This is searchable by local authority and would enable volunteers in one area to 
contact volunteers in another.   
 
Discussion 
 
Returning to our central questions:  
 
Further to understanding the experience and issues of asset transfer for the facilities we 
examined, what answers do we have to our central questions? Can we understand the 
transfer of these leisure facilities, in the context of austerity and/or progressive 
localism? Overall, who is empowered by the form of localism constituted and how does 
this compare with the issues that have been faced by engendering the Big Society 
nationally, across all service sectors? 
  
How has the process of asset transfer of public sport centres and libraries to voluntary 
groups been driven by and reflected austerity? 
The transfer of the facilities we examined was driven by the need to cut budgets rather than 
by local authority support for ideals of empowerment and local responsibility.  This 
characteristic was evident in local authorities generally reacting to community groups, rather 
than developing them.  As a consequence, this privileged volunteer groups with high social 
Formatted: Highlight
capital; in terms of business skills, confidence and a belief they could intervene successfully; 
and groups in stable communities.  This represents austerity localism and may be 
exacerbating social and economic inequalities.  However, there was a balance: authorities 
helping Libraries A and D, and the support agency assisting Sport Facility G were committed 
to developing volunteer capacity, but were limited in their ability to do this, again by budget 
cuts.   
The need to respond rapidly meant that those with the best market solutions were advantaged, 
mirroring critiques that the rolling back of state favours large and commercial solutions 
(Featherstone et al., 2012).  The community groups we looked at were small and usually 
interested in one facility only. Large leisure trusts will be a safer and easier option for transfer 
of a large tranche of facilities.  However, these operators will only take on potentially 
profitable facilities.  An LQWHUYLHZHHUHIHUUHGWRRQHVXFKOHLVXUHWUXVWDVµSUHGDWRU\¶EHFDXVH
it was not focused on serving the needs of a specific community and lacked an ethos of 
transferring responsibility and power to local people and thus would not be able to engender 
the same community engagement as local trusts.   
Following a period of austerity, public sport facilities and libraries offered for transfer may 
operate in difficult market conditions, requiring capital investment.  The power and control of 
community groups may be limited by their reliance on the local authority for funding, their 
inability to obtain grants and loans which are based on longer lease periods, their lack of 
freedom to offer whichever sport services the market desires (free from TUPE constraints) 
and the condition of the facility they have taken on.  Facility condition is a difficult area to 
negotiate as some buildings will need substantial repair soon, whereas in others, future capital 
costs are uncertain, but pose a potential long-term burden for volunteers.  In this sense, the 
WHUPµDVVHWWUDQVIHU¶PD\GLVJXLVHWKHWUDQVIHURIOLDELOLWLHVDVQRWHGE\+DVWLQJVHWDO
LQWKHLUVWXG\RIWKUHH(QJOLVKORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶DSSURDFKHVWRPDQDJLQJDXVWHULW\ They 
found that the RIILFLDOHPSKDVLVRI³«UHJHQHUDWLYHDQGVRFLDOFDSLWDOEHQHILWV´ (p.613) 
sometimes masked the real impetus to transfer responsibility for future costs.  µ$VVHWWUDQVIHU¶
UDWKHUWKDQµOLDELOLW\WUDQVIHU¶FRXOGWKHUHIRUHLWVHOIEHSDUWRf a hegemonic discourse.  Clarity 
is also required over the implications of grants awarded prior to transfer, and whether they 
might represent a liability on the new organisation.  In the case of Sport Facility B, it was a 
surprise to the volunteers that, at transfer, they became liable (if they closed) for a near-
£500,000 Lottery Grant that had been awarded to the facility in 2002, (even though their 
liability would be restricted by their status as a limited company).   
$³healthy and active relationship wLWKWKHORFDOSXEOLFVHFWRU´ is important for localism to be 
successful (Fenwick & Gibbon, 2015, p.15).  However, with large local authority sport and 
leisure budget cuts, many facilities were up for transfer within a tight time-frame, which 
allows little time for a relationship to be developed.  Others have noted that the speed of cuts 
can restrict innovation (Hastings et. al. 2015).  Clearly, there is no consistent support across 
local authorities and many of the facilities were critical about the lack of (and/or 
appropriateness of) advice on asset transfer, and the confusion surrounding the process.  Our 
facilities had all transferred prior to 2011 and local authority support may now have 
improved.  We also found little evidence of businesses showing leadership in committing 
resources for the common good, apart from minor sponsorship in kind.  Overall, the limited 
and variable support represents a void of leadership on localism, similarly identified by 
Fenwick and Gibbon (2015).  
In this austere context, where community groups must support themselves and drive their 
requests for support, the asset transfer of leisure facilities privileges a form of localism based 
on high levels of social capital and community stability (Williams et al., 2014).  There was 
some evidence of effective local authority volunteer development and grass roots political 
support assisting facilities; however these resources were allocated in response to demand.  
For example, library support groups emerged in one city and then asked for support from the 
local Volunteer Action organisation.  In contrast, in the town where Libraries A were located, 
the development officer realised he had to allocate more time to groups in disadvantaged 
areas because they needed more help.  Thus, as long as support reacts to demands from 
groups which have formed themselves rather than helping to develop the groups initially and 
provide long-term support, such support is likely to be focused on more advantaged areas.  
Paradoxically, the largest cuts in local government budgets have occurred in the most 
deprived areas where the greatest support is required (SPER Institute, 2014).  So in line with 
the academic critique of the Big Society agenda, asset transfer was found to be more viable in 
socially advantaged areas (Fenwick & Gibbon, 2015; King, 2014; Williams et al., 2014). 
 
 
+RZKDVDVVHWWUDQVIHUEHHQµSURJUHVVLYH¶LQHPSRZHULQJYROXQWHHUVDQGPDNLQJWKH
service more responsive to local needs? 
 
Similarly to other authors (Crisp, 2015; Featherstone et al. 2012; Morse & Munroe, 2015), we 
found evidence of facilities which represented a form of progressive localism in the sense that 
they were strongly identified with their respective local communities, and this shared identity 
motivated volunteer support as collective action to further a mutual set of values.  Volunteers 
clearly coalesced around a shared set of interests or values in a desire to provide for 
themselves and their community, albeit with the threat of facility closure as a motivator 
(Nichols et al. 2015).  This supports the view of Bovaird and Loeffler (2012, p.1137) that: 
 
«WKHUHDSSHDUVWREHDKXJHODWHQWZLOOLQJQHVVRIFLWL]HQVWREHFRPHPRUHLQYROYHG
but only if they can play a worthwhile role.  However, citizens are only willing to co-
produce in a relatively narrow range of activities that are genuinely important to them.  
 
Where transfer was successful there had been a genuine transfer of power, as advocated by 
the Big Society Audit, to harness the motivations of the volunteers and to allow them to take 
advantage of flexibility to adapt the service to better meet local needs.  The transferred 
facilities had considerable autonomy; for example, in relation to pricing and programming.  
This autonomy meant that the volunteer groups felt that they had power and responsibility.  
Without giving them such independence it would have been difficult to motivate them to take 
over the facilities.  These benefits provided impetus for community empowerment and 
survival in the initial years of transfer, but the facilities were still dependant on local 
government, in the form of peppercorn rents and reduced rates.  Thus there is resistance to 
neoliberal conservatisms (Williams et al., 2014) to the extent that our groups offered an 
alternative to private sector provision.   Greater sensitivity to local needs was a very positive, 
progressive outcome of small asset transfers.  However, we have not been able to identify 
ZKHUHWKHJURXSVKDYHFKDOOHQJHGQHROLEHUDOLVWKHJHPRQ\LQWKHZD\µSURJUHVVLYH¶LVGHILQHG
by FeatherVWRQHHWDORU/HYLWDV¶ (2012) examples of working class organisation over 
the last 200 years.  Our examples are mainly very recent and their priority has been with the 
practicalities of asset transfer, with limited time and resources.   
 
Does the transfer exhibit the limitations of engendering a Big Society, as indicated by the 
Civil Exchange audit (2015)? 
The limitations of engendering the Big Society through leisure facility transfer mirror those 
identified by the Civil Exchange Audit (2015).  The empowerment of community generally 
appeared to be an incidental or secondary consequence of state retraction, rather than a prime 
objective of the local authorities. The localism constituted, is reliant on high social capital, 
ZKHUHDVWKHGHVLUHGµVXSSRUWRIDVWURQJSXEOLFVHFWRU¶)HQZLFN	*LEERQSZDV
less apparent.  In our examples a core of volunteers were highly motivated by shared values 
to contribute a great amount of time and effort.  However, such effort and capacity needs to 
be supported and nurtured by the rest of society so that volunteers feel they arHµIORZLQJZLWK
WKHWLGH¶UDWKHUWKDQEDWWOLQJDJDLQVWLW8QOHVVPRUHVXSSRUWLVSURYLGHGWKHIDFLOLWLHVZKLFK
remain open will be increasingly in the areas of highest social capital. Yet, as King (2014) 
notes, achieving progressive localism may not be financially viable. Local government is 
balancing the giving of resources to help transferred facilities to succeed (such as maximal 
rate relief, favourable leases, guarantees of capital repairs and support of development 
officers), with limiting its support because the initial impetus for asset transfer was to save 
costs.  Local authority and voluntary agency support needs to be stronger: our research shows 
the important supportive role of Volunteer Advice Centres.  The Audit (2015, p.9) advocates 
³targetinJUHVRXUFHVDQGVXSSRUWRQDUHDVRIJUHDWHVWQHHG«>DQGHQVXULQJ@YROXQWDU\VHFWRU
infraVWUXFWXUHLVSURSHUO\VXSSRUWHG´.  Similarly, the ³paradox of large companies benefitting 
PRVWIURPSXEOLFVHUYLFHFRQWUDFWV«ZLWKDELDVDJDLQVWWKH local and the volunWDU\VHFWRU´ 
(Civic Exchange, 2015, p.7) is reflected in the market for sports and leisure facilities, 
although not in libraries.  This means that in sports and leisure, volunteer-led single facility 
organisations will probably remain the exception.  
Conclusion 
On balance, we conclude that the asset transfer of the leisure facilities we examined are best 
conceptualised as austerity localism (Featherstone et al., 2012) with a progressive potential 
due to the resilience and resourcefulness of volunteer groups with high levels of social 
capital, skills and knowledge.  However, our empirical work illustrates the complexities of 
the balance between the two.  Volunteer-led groups are empowered to have autonomy over 
most of the management decisions in the facilities.  They are more flexible in meeting local 
needs.  Yet the facilities still require local authority financial support, if only indirectly.  
Asset transfer has been driven by budget cuts which, in turn, have reduced the support 
available to community groups, wLWKWKHDXWKRULWLHVEHLQJERWK³victims and instigators of 
QHZIRUPVRI«DXVWHULW\´ (Donald et al. 2014, p.5).  Local authorities have not had the 
resources to support a truly progressive localism in which all community groups are 
empowered.  Without these resources, the community groups who are successful will be 
those who already have high stocks of social capital, operating in more favourable markets, 
and thus existing inequalities will be potentially entrenched rather than challenged through 
the asset transfer process.  The overwhelming need to grapple with the process of asset 
transfer has left little time and energy for volunteer-led groups to consider ways of 
challenging a hegemonic neo-liberalist agenda; although they might in the future.   
The limited and uneven sport and library asset transfers are due to the constraints on 
achieving the Big Society and localism, as identified by the Civil Exchange Audit (2015).  
Where a market exists for the management of sports facilities, large established providers are 
favoured.  In contrast, asset transfer of libraries to volunteers is more viable, partly because 
there is no market competition, and possibly because the management of a library is less 
complex.  If volunteer governance and delivery of sport and library facilities is to be 
equitable, within and across communities, local state and voluntary agency support must be 
developed.  As Levitas suggested (2012) we can have faith in the potential for organisations 
to emerge which challenge the Big Society narrative, but only if social and economic 
conditions are changed to allow this.  
Clearly volunteer led groups and local authorities are rapidly learning about the asset transfer 
process so further research could include examples of failed transfers to help develop 
guidance.  Reviewing transferred facilities three years after transfer would indicate good 
practice to ensure sustainability, both financially and in the enthusiasm and efforts of 
volunteers.  
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